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IT was ~ years ago that Winston Churchill came
to Westminster and warned his audience and the
nation of an ominous threat to our peace and secu-
rity by enemies from abroad. The conrse of world
events in the intervening years has fully justified
his concern.
Today, I would warn you of a different threat of
similar gravity — a threat that, in this instance, comes
not from abroad but from within our own society.
It is a threat so complex and confusing that, to para-
phrase John Maynard Keynes, not one man in a niil-
lion fully comprehends its true nature. The threat I
would warn you of is accelerating inflation — a burden
which our nation has endured for the past decade
and which, unless appropriate counter-measures are
promptly taken, is likely to have catastrophic eco-
nomic, social, and political consequences in the years
to come.
Your graduating class, the Class of 1980, is part of
an inflation generation. You have already been wit-
nesses to and victims of rapidly increasing prices,
record-high rates of interest, a marked decline in the
value of the dollar on international exchanges, and
the many other manifestations of persistent inflation.
The economic environment you have inherited
stands in sharp contrast to that which faced my grad-
uating class some 40 years ago. Unlike what you are
experiencing, the Class of 1940 was part of a deflation
generation. We had grown up during a time of severe
unemployment and major economic recession. In sharp
contrast to the spiraling price levels of today, prices
in 1940 were actually lower than they had been 10
years earlier. I cite this contrast merely to emphasize
that, while the nature of the economic malaise facing
your class and mine is in a sense quite different, we
have both been confronted with circumstances of crit-
ical significance to the survival of our economic and
political system.
No challenge facing this Class of 1980 is more com-
pelling than that of breaking the momentum of chronic
inflation. Unless this is accomplished, there is no hope
of restoring to this nation the economic growth and
stability necessary for its continued prosperity and
security.
The evils of inflation are many. Some are well
known; others are well hidden. Perhaps the best un-
derstood are its economic costs. It was not so long
ago that “a penny saved” was actually “a penny
earned.” That principle — that savingwill be rewarded
— is vital to economic progress. For without saving,
investment (that is, the formation of capital) is not
possible. Without capital formation, labor is denied
the tools with which to increase the production of
goods and services. Unfortunately, however, inflation
has severely eroded the incentive to save. A person
who placed $10,000 in a savings account 15 years
ago would by now have accumulated an additional
$8,000 in compounded interest. After adjusting for the
rise in prices over the past 15 years, however, that
$18,000 is actually worth only about $8,000 in “real”
value.
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This lesson has not been lost on you, nor has it
passed unnoticed by millions of other Americans. As
a result, there has been a retreat from savings and
the associated investment so essential for growth in
productivity. In the past five years alone, the rate of
personal saving has fallen from more than 7 percent
to 4½ percent annually. This, in turn, has resulted in
diminished growth of investment in industrial plant
and equipment and a serious drop in commitments to
research and development, both of which underlie
industrial productivity. Since the early part of the
1970s, productivity growth has slowed to about one-
half of its former rate. That rising real income is
impossible without rising productivity should come as
no surprise to you graduates, most of whom, I have
been told, are graduating with degrees in economics
and business administration. You know that when the
pie ceases to grow larger, the portions must grow
smaller. In this case, smaller portions mean a declin-
ing standard of living for all of us.
Yet, as bad as the economic effects of inflation are,
they are less worrisome than another seldom noticed
or, at least, seldom mentioned aspect of the problem:
that is, the threat to our personal political freedom
posed by inflation— the fact that it can destroy the
very foundation of our democratic form of government.
Inflation erodes our political system by robbing us, as
individuals, of the opportunity to approve or disap-
prove the most basic of government decisions — those
of money creation and taxation. Inflation permits gov-
ernment to finance its expenditures in a manner that
hides its actions from the scrntiny of its citizens.
Government expenditures, traditionally, have been
financed either by taxes levied by Congress or by bor-
rowing from the private sector to finance deficits.
These methods have the advantage of forcing Con-
gress to establish, in plain sight of the electorate, a
level of spending and to support that spending
through direct taxation or borrowing. Citizens are
given the opportunity to approve or disapprove of the
government’s actions at the polls. This is the tradi-
tional manner by which elected officials are held ac-
countable for their actions.
In recent years, however, a practice of “backdoor”
financing has evolved which enables government to
circumvent its traditional accountability. In the past
two decades, the federal government, instead of sup-
porting its expenditures by taxation, has come to rely
more and more on deficit spending to finance its oper-
ations, Now deficit spending, by itself, is not neces-
sarily inflationary, if deficits are financed solely by
increased borrowing in private markets. However,
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higher interest rates, which are a by-product of gov-
ernment borrowing in private markets, are not popular
choices for elected officials. So instead of “facing the
music” of increased taxes or higher interest rates,
fiscal policymakers have made use of the technique of
Thidden financing” — hidden, that is, from the voters.
When it resorts to hidden financing, the govern-
ment creates money through the monetization or pur-
chase of its debt by the Federal Reserve. ‘When the
Fed monetizes federal deficits, it increases commercial
bank reserves and thereby expands the supply of
money available for spending. Increases in the money
supply lead to accelerated inflation, reducing the pur-
chasing power of individuals as assuredly as if taxes
had been increased in the first place. In fact, taxes
have been increased for inflation is a tax. It is a tax
that is neither subject to voter approval nor directly
associated with voter-approved government spending
decisions. Our founding fathers would have called
such an arrangement “taxation without representation”
and, indeed, it is truly that.
Hidden financing has enabled the government to
expand its role substantially without a specific man-
date from the electorate. Whereas in 1940 federal
government expenditures amounted to 13.5% of the
gross national product, last year they consumed 21%
of the resources of the economy. When you include
welfare, social security, and debt service costs, the
government’s share of economic consumption has
grown from one-sixth of the total economy in 1940
to one-third today. Would this great expansion in the
size of government have occurred had the American
people been given the opportunity explicitly to de-
cide the issue at the polls? I doubt it!
In view of the serious nature of the economic and
political consequences of inflation, I would be remiss
if I did not suggest a workable way of alleviating
the problem.
Clearly, inflation is not a self-generating and un-
controllable phenomenon. It occurs only when money
growth outstrips the growth of production of goods
and services. It can be diminished in one of two ways:
either by increasing production or by slowing the rate
of money growth. Both of these alternatives ment
consideration.
Unfortunately, almost all available options for in-
creasing productivity involve long-range actions and
long-run responses. Tax reforms, for example, would
increase incentives to save and invest, and thereby
increase productivity. A lessening of government reg.
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increase output. Reductions in the size of government
would free resources for use by the private sector and
thereby increase the output of goods and services de-
manded by consumers. However, all of these are
changes of an institutional nature that entail legis-
lative actions as well as a fundamental reordering of
expressed national priorities. While highly desirable,
it would be unrealistic to believe that they could be
brought to fruition quickly enough to bave a demon-
strable early effect on inflation.
A reduction in the rate of money growth, on the
other hand, offers a means of reducing inflation fairly
quickly. The Federal Reserve, through its open mar-
ket operations, can increase or decrease bank re-
serves almost instantaneously and thereby can quickly
expand or contract the amount of spendable money
in the hands of the public. By gradually reducing the
growth of the money supply, the Fed can bring down
inflation over a predictable and reasonably short pe-
riod of time. In this connection, I would point out
that there is no responsible way to reduce the basic
rate of inflationinstantaneously. To seek an immediate
solution by drastically slamming on the money growth
brakes would have a shocking effect on the economy
in terms of lost output and high unemployment. It
would create intolerable conditions of recession which
in turn would bring forth pressures for inflationary
actions to spend our way out of our distress. However,
a gradual reduction in the growth of the money sup-
ply, say at a rate of 1 or 2% per year, would exert
minimal economic stress and would significantly re-
duce inflation within a few years.
Although such a policy has been the stated object
of the Federal Reserve System for almost a decade,
the manner in which the policy was implemented in
the past tended to frustrate the Fed’s good intentions.
Prior to October 6, 1979, the Fed had two incom-
patible monetary policy goals: the reduction of money
growth and the stabilization of interest rates in the
short run. The simultaneous achievement of these two
objectives wasfrequently impossible. Whenever money
growth targets were incompatible with interest rate
targets, the objective of money growth control was
abandoned in favor of short-run interest rate stabiliza-
tion. This not only contributed to rising inflation, but
caused the Federal Reserve to lose credibility in the
eyes of the public as its record of performance failed
to measure up to its stated objectives.
Fortunately, this has changed. There is now solid
reason for optimism that monetary policymaking has
finally turned the corner and will be a more success-
ful tool in coping with inflation than in the past.
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Last October, the Federal Reserve announced new
operating procedures which, in effect, eliminate the
previous dilemma of concurrently setting interest rate
and monetary growth targets. Stabilization of interest
rates, in the short run, has been abandoned as a tool
of policy, and the goal of reducing money growth has
been reaffirmed. What is even more heartening is
that evidence to date indicates that the Fed will be
successful in achieving its money growth targets.
Money growth has been substantially reduced from
the inflation-generating levels of the pre-October pe-
riod. If this trend is continued, there is ample reason
to believe that we will experience reduced inflation in
the months and years ahead. Interest rates have been
permitted to fluctuate freely. Furthermore, the initial
dramatic interest rate increases, which were attrib-
utable to early doubts about the Fed’s ability to
achieve its announced goals, have been reversed. As
more people become convincedthat the rate of growth
of money is indeed being controlled and will con-
tinue to be reduced, inflationary expectations will
recede and interest rates will continue to decline.
If one were to describe the current state of mone-
tary policy-making in terms that the late Winston
Churchill might have used, it could be said that “the
tide of battle is turning, but the day is not yet won.”
Significant economic, intellectual, and political bar-
riers must still be overcome before the public can feel
truly confident that the Fed’s new procedures will be
permitted to be carried through to fruition. Interest
rates, although easing, are still at relatively high levels,
and important parts of the economy such as housing,
farming, and other interest-sensitive activities are feel-
ing the effects of credit restraint. Continued restraint
will mean a period of softness in the economy, and
individuals who are adversely affected can be expected
to call vociferously for a return to a more stimulative
monetary policy. Moreover, many disciples of interest
rate stabilization find it difficult to accept control of
money and credit as a legitimate basis for the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. Finally, 1980 is an elec-
tion year, and the bitter medicine of monetary re-
straint has never been welcomed by candidates for
public office. Pressures such as these will undoubtedly
continue to test the resolve of policymakers to persist
in theft efforts to eliminate inflation.
Whether or not yours will continue to be an in-
flation generation depends directly on our ability,
collectively, to resist the pressures of those who, un-
willing to tolerate the pain of the moment, will call
for a return to the expansive policies that created the
current inflation. In their desire for relief in the short
run, they would have us believe that a little inflation
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is not so bad, that we can adjust to it and learn to
tolerate it.
This is simply not true. There is no hope for a per-
sistent “little inflation.” Wherever nations have ac-
cepted inflation as a way of life, they have discovered
that today’s 10% inflation becomes tomorrow’s 12%,
the next year’s 15% inflation, and so on.
This trend need not continue here, if we have the
discipline to accept a certain amount of temporary
pain for the promise of better circumstances in the
future. While yours is presently an inflation genera-
tion, it need not remain so. Indeed, it must not re-
main so.
6
I have described the devastating consequences of
a continuation of accelerating inflation, and I have
offered what I believe to be a practical and workable
way to eliminate the problem. It is up to you as
thinking men and women to take the lead in stand-
ing for what is in the best interests of the free society
of which you are a part. Your generation has a clear
choice. It can go down in history as one which toler-
ated inflation and thus gave witness to the decline of
America as a great economic power, or it can leave
its mark as the generation which eliminated inflation
and restored the foundation of stability and growth
so necessary to our national survival. I have full con-
fidence that you will make the proper choice.
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